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This paper shows that there are striking implications that stem from including durable goods in 
otherwise conventional sticky price models.  The behavior of these models depends heavily on 
whether durable goods are present and whether these goods have sticky prices.  If long-lived 
durables have sticky prices, then even small durables sectors can cause the model to behave as 
though most prices were sticky.  Conversely, if durable goods prices are flexible then the model 
exhibits unwelcome behavior.  Flexibly priced durables contract during periods of economic 
expansion.  The tendency towards negative comovement is very robust and can be so strong as to 
dominate the aggregate behavior of the model.  In an instructive limiting case, money has no 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern theories of the monetary business cycle typically attribute central importance to 
nominal rigidities.  Much of our understanding of sticky-price models comes from one-
sector models with symmetric firms using identical price-setting rules.  Often these 
models abstract from durable goods and focus solely on the production of nondurables.  
In reality, large fluctuations in the production of durable goods are the most prominent 
feature of the response to monetary shocks.  Empirically, business and residential 
investment fall sharply following a monetary contraction, while the production of 
nondurables falls only slightly.  The assumption of symmetric price rigidity is also at 
odds with reality.  To make a stark comparison, the price of a bottle of Coca Cola was 
fixed at five cents for a period of 70 years (see Levy and Young [2002]) while the prices 
of many agricultural commodities vary daily.    
How important are these two types of heterogeneity?  Does the presence of 
durables have important qualitative implications for the analysis of sticky price models?  
When some prices are sticky and some flexible, does the economy behave more like a 
flexible price model or more like a sticky price model?   
The answers to these questions are related.  We analyze a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with both sticky and flexible price sectors, and with both durable and 
nondurable goods.  The aggregate behavior of the model depends crucially on which 
sectors have sticky prices.  For the model to behave conventionally, the durable goods 
prices must be sticky.  It is neither necessary nor sufficient for nondurables to have sticky 
prices.  This is true even if the nondurables are the lion’s share of GDP.  Furthermore, in 
the presence of long-lived durables, the production of nondurables might not react to 
monetary policy – even when their prices are very rigid.  Conversely, we show that 
durables with flexible prices pose serious problems for these models.  Typically, 
production of flexibly priced durables falls when the economy expands.  This result is 
extremely robust and is sharply at odds with the facts.
1  In some cases, this contrarian 
                                                 
1 The mechanism that leads to the contrarian behavior of flexibly priced durables goods in our model is a 
particular instance of the more general comovement problem discussed by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
[1989].  They show that in multi-sector general equilibrium models, shocks that cause an expansion in one 
sector often lead to contractions in the others.     3
behavior can be so strong as to result in an equilibrium in which money has no influence 
on aggregate production or employment at all.  
Why are durables so important?  Durables have interesting and unique properties 
that flow directly from their longevity.  The stock– and thus the associated shadow value 
– of durables is nearly constant over the modest horizon for which monetary disturbances 
might have real effects.  As a result, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for 
purchases of durables is naturally high.  For durables with very low depreciation rates, 
such as housing and business structures, this elasticity is nearly infinite.  Even modest 
changes in relative prices can lead to pronounced swings in the production of these 
goods.  Moreover, these effects can be so large as to dominate the overall change in 
output.   In contrast, nondurables are subject to the consumption smoothing logic of the 
permanent income hypothesis, leaving relatively little room for consumers to substitute 
intertemporally.  Consequently, nondurables play a much smaller role in fluctuations of 
aggregate output.  
Our findings have several implications.  First, the fact that many goods have 
flexible prices is not a problem for sticky price models.  Even if most prices are flexible, 
these models will continue to function “properly” as long as there is some nominal 
rigidity for durable goods.  In addition, the observation that some goods with very sticky 
prices do not react to monetary policy is also not evidence against sticky price theories.  
Second, empirical evidence on price rigidity for durable goods is much more relevant 
than evidence for sticky prices in nondurable goods.
2  Third, because these models have 
difficulty accommodating long-lived durables with flexible prices, sticky wages or sticky 
intermediate goods prices may be necessary in New Keynesian theories.  Because they 
impart endogenous price rigidity to goods whose final prices are flexible, wage rigidities 
can cause such sectors to increase production even when other costs rise.   
                                                 
2 Most empirical research on sticky prices focuses on nondurables.  Leading examples include Cecchetti’s 
1986 study of magazine prices, Slade’s 1998 study of supermarket pricing, Levy and Young’s recent 2002 
study of Coca Cola prices, and Kashyap’s 1995 study of L.L.Bean catalogues.  Other papers that focus on 
nondurables include, Aguirregabiria [1999], Bils and Klenow [2003], Lach and Tsiddon [1992, 1996], 
Levy, Bergen, Dutta, and Venable [1997], Pesendorfer [1996], Slade [1996, 1998], Tommasi [1993] and 
Warren and Barsky [1995].  Blinder [1998] and Carlton [1986] are exceptions.  The study by Bils and 
Klenow [2003] includes goods that are durables in the NIPA accounts (cars, washing machines, etc.) but 
they do not include durables like houses, factories, irrigation systems, etc. Thus they do not address the 
question of whether large long-lived durables have important nominal rigidities.    4
Previous papers that have studied models with flexible and sticky price sectors 
include Blinder and Mankiw [1984], Ohanian and Stockman [1994], Ohanian, Stockman, 
and Kilian [1995], and Bils, Klenow and Kryvstov [2003].  Only Ohanian et al. [1995] 
includes a durables sector.  The simulations in their paper exhibit behavior that is 
consistent with our results.  The comment on Ohanian et al. by Leahy [1995] hints at 
some of the logic behind these effects, but leaves several questions unanswered – 
particularly why the overall output effect is so close to zero in their model.  Ohanian and 
Stockman [1994] allow for a variable intertemporal elasticity of substitution across two 
nondurable sectors.  Because the naturally high intertemporal elasticity of substitution for 
durable goods spending plays a central role in our paper, to some extent, the economics 
in this paper parallels that in Ohanian and Stockman [1994].  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we briefly 
document the pronounced behavior of the production of durable and nondurable goods 
following large changes in monetary policy.  We also show that the relative price of 
durables to nondurables falls during monetary contractions.   Section 3 presents a general 
framework for the analysis of durables in sticky price environments.  Section 4 considers 
long-lived durables with perfectly flexible prices.  This is an instructive limiting case 
which starkly reveals the importance of price rigidity in durables sectors.  In section 5, 
we augment the analysis by numerically analyzing particular instance of the model.  
Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. DURABLE GOODS AND MONETARY SHOCKS: STYLIZED FACTS  
Before turning to the model, we examine prices and production of durable goods in 
periods surrounding contractionary shifts in monetary policy.  Following a monetary 
tightening, the production of durables falls dramatically.  Moreover, durable goods prices 
fall relative to the prices of nondurables following monetary contractions.   
We focus on the economy’s behavior following a few clear-cut, dramatic changes 
in monetary policy.  Specifically, we use Romer dates as indicators of pronounced 
monetary tightness.  The advantages of this approach are that our attention is drawn to the 
most drastic changes in monetary policy and that it allows for the possibility that   5
important parts of monetary policy may be systematic.
3  This approach does have 
shortcomings.  As Shapiro [1992] demonstrates, these monetary contractions are not 
exogenous.  Romer dates tend to occur when inflation is high and rising and when 
unemployment is low.  The “shocks” we identify are few in number and are not ranked 
by magnitude.  Finally, there is reason to believe that Romer dates come too late to catch 
the inception of monetary tightenings
4 – a problem that is mitigated, however, by the 
approach taken below.  
We document the behavior of several economic variables before and after the 
Romer dates.
5  For any variable x, we take averages of xt+j /xt given that t is a Romer date 
for j = -4, … 16.  We compare this series with averages of xt+j /xt for all dates.  The 
resulting series give us a window of observation on the economy during these episodes.  
We look before the date itself (i.e. before j = 0) to examine the behavior of the variable as 
the Romer date approaches.  In addition, we suspect that Romer dates may lag the actual 
changes in policy.  
Before proceeding to the results we should make a remark concerning the 
interpretation of the “trend” line in the figures.  This is the average path of xt+j /xt for j = -
4, … 16, averaged over all dates t.  Statistically, this is the best predictor of the relative 
size of x, j periods before or after an arbitrary date t.  Following a Romer date, some 
variables fall below “trend” and don’t recover.  This is because the timing of the Romer 
dates is endogenous.  Typically Romer dates occur when the economy is “above trend”.  
Thus, some of the response of a variable should be interpreted as simple mean reversion.  
Figures 1.A and B show the average behavior of several economic variables in the 
quarters before and after a Romer date.  The figures include bands to indicate one 
standard deviation around the point estimates.  One thing to notice immediately is that the 
response of these variables is much more dramatic than responses following “shocks” in 
                                                 
3 An alternative would be to examine impulse responses to “identified” monetary policy shocks from a 
structural VAR.  This has the advantage that, in the best case, it identifies the truly exogenous part of 
monetary policy. However, by excluding the systematic component of monetary policy, structural VARs 
miss the lion’s share of the variation.  Shocks identified by a VAR may not be monetary policy shocks at 
all, but rather the result of misspecification, omitted variables, or uninterpretable noise. For analysis using a 
VAR approach, see Erceg and Levin [2003].  
4 Bernanke and Mihov [1998] argue that Romer dates occur when their index describing the stance of 
monetary policy (the Bernanke-Mihov index) is at a trough, indicating that the actual change in monetary 
policy was made prior to the date. 
5 This approach goes back to Burns and Mitchell and was used recently in Doyle and Faust [2001].   6
a VAR.  The main reason for this difference is that the “events” we examine are not small 
“shocks” to a stable monetary policy rule but rather are fundamental changes in policy.  
In a typical VAR system, a 1% shock to the federal funds rate reverts to a “normal” level 
quickly and induces only mild responses in GDP and the components of production.  
Following a Romer date, the federal funds rate continues to increase by roughly 4 points 
(400 basis points).  In fact, the rise in the funds rate is more than this when we take into 
account the fact that interest rates were rising before the Romer event.  
In Figure 1.A, we show that following a Romer date, durable goods sectors 
contract very sharply while nondurable goods (and overall GDP) do not.  Relative to the 
reference period (date 0), housing starts fall by 33%.  The trough occurs seven quarters 
after the Romer date.  Starts remain more than 20% below the reference level for nine 
quarters (from t+4 until t+12). Real residential investment also falls substantially. After 
nine quarters, residential investment is 22% lower than it was in the reference date. Real 
automobile sales fall by 25%. They remain more than 10% below their reference level for 
eight quarters (from t+4 until t+11).  Real durables purchases fall by 12.5% relative to the 
reference date.  In contrast, the production of nondurables and GDP as a whole reacts 
much less.  Real nondurables rise above trend immediately after the event and fall below 
“trend” after seven quarters.  Real GDP does not fall relative to its level in the reference 
date.  Relative to “trend” it falls by 6%.
6  
In addition to the effects on durables spending, there are also significant effects on 
the relative prices of durables and nondurables.  The top four panels of Figure 1.B show 
the average responses of four relative prices following a Romer date.  The price of new 
houses relative to the CPI for nondurables falls by 12% in comparison to the reference 
date.
7  The trough occurs nine quarters after the Romer date.  The relative price of cars 
(measured as the CPI for new autos relative to the CPI for nondurables) falls by more 
than 6% relative to the base date and by 5% relative to the trend line.  The price of 
durables relative to nondurables (measured by their CPIs) falls by 4.8% relative to the 
reference date and by 3.7% relative to trend.
8  The bottom two panels show the evolution 
                                                 
6 Aggregate employment follows a similar pattern.  
7 This number is for the median house price. The number for the average house price is similar.  
8 While impulse responses to money shocks in identified VARs show strong responses of production of 
durables they do not exhibit the pronounced movement in relative prices. See Erceg and Levin [2003].    7
of the (nominal) average house price and median house price following a Romer date.  
Although these prices continue to rise, their rates of inflation drop immediately after the 
reference date.   
To summarize, the production of durables responds significantly to changes in 
monetary policy while the production of nondurables does not.  Moreover, the relative 
price of durable goods to nondurable goods appears to fall after a monetary contraction. 
In particular, housing starts fall by more than 30% and the price of new houses relative to 
nondurables falls by roughly 10%.  
 
3.  GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
We consider a dynamic economy with durable and nondurable goods.  Some goods have 
sticky prices and others have flexible prices.  The standard New Keynesian model with 
only nondurables and symmetric price rigidity is a special case of the model.  We focus 
on durable consumption goods rather than productive capital to emphasize that it is 




Consumers get utility from both nondurable and durable consumption goods.  Goods are 
indexed by j.  C refers to nondurable goods and D refers to durable goods.  Thus, a 
typical durable good is Djt and a typical nondurable good is Cjt.  Nt is labor supplied at 
date t.  Total utility is time separable and additively separable in labor.   
() () 12 12
0
, ..., ,... , ,... ...
t
t t jt t t jt t
t
UE u C C C D D D v N β
∞
=
⎛⎞ ⎟ ⎡⎤ ⎜ = − ⎟ ⎜ ⎢⎥ ⎟ ⎣⎦ ⎜ ⎟ ⎝⎠ ∑  
To some extent, the additive separability of labor is important for our results.  We will 
return to this point later. 
Let Xjt denote net purchases of type j goods at time t.  The household's nominal 
budget constraint is then: 
() 11 1 1 jt jt t t t t t t t t t
j
PX M WN T i S S M −− − + ≤ +Π +++ − + ∑ , 
                                                 
9 We discuss productive capital briefly later.   8
Here, Πt are profits returned to the consumer through dividends, Tt are lump-sum nominal 
transfers net of taxes, Mt are nominal money balances held at time t, St is nominal savings 
and it is the nominal interest rate.  For nondurables Cjt = Xjt while for durable goods: 
() 1 1 jt jt jt j DXD δ − =+ − . 
We allow for different rates of physical depreciation for different durable goods. 
 
Labor Supply and the Demand for Goods and Services 
Taking prices as given, consumers choose Xjt, Nt, and St to maximize utility.  Let  t λ be the 
marginal utility of an additional dollar of income at time t and let γjt be the shadow value 
- the contribution to lifetime utility of an additional unit - of good j.  If good j is a 
nondurable, then the shadow value is simply the current marginal utility of an additional 
unit:  ,
C
jt j t MU γ =  where  ,
C
jt MU  denotes the marginal utility of nondurable j at time t.  If j 
is a durable,  jt γ is the present value of future marginal service flows of the durable, 
discounted by the subjective rate of time preference and the depreciation rate:  
  () ()
2 2
,1 ,2 1 1 ...
DD D
jt jt j j t j j t MU MU MU γβ δβ δ ++ =+ − + − +  (1) 
This equation turns out to be a key equation in the model.  
The first order condition for the purchase of any good j is:  
  jt t jt P γλ = . (2) 
The first order condition for the supply of labor (Nt) is  () ' tt t vN W λ = .   Finally, the first 
order condition for savings (St) implies that the nominal interest rate satisfies:  
  ( ) 1 1 tt t t iE λβ λ + ⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎣ ⎦ . (3) 
Combining (2) with the first order condition for labor supply gives a set of 
conditions (one for each good) that relate employment to the demand for goods and 
services: 







γ = . (4) 
Equation (4) says the utility cost of an additional unit of labor must be exactly balanced 
by the benefit of spending Wt extra dollars on any of the goods in the economy.    9
 
Money Demand 
Money is injected into the economy through lump sum transfers Tt to the agents (Tt can 
be negative).  We do not model the demand for money explicitly.  For simplicity we 
assume that money demand is proportional to nominal purchases: 
tj t j t
j
M PX =∑ . 
Of course, money demand might also be related to the nominal interest rate (an “LM 
curve”) or other macroeconomic variables, but this is inessential for the basic results.  
The important feature of money demand is that when the money supply increases, firms 
have incentives to raise their prices. 
 
3.2 FIRMS 
We treat productive capital as a predetermined fixed factor but we allow labor to flow 
freely across industries (later we relax both of these assumptions).  Firms convert labor 
input into outputs according to their production functions. 
( ) jt j jt X Fn =  
Where njt is employment in sector j.  We allow each firm to have a different production 
function. We assume that each Fj satisfies  '0 j F >  and  '' 0 j F ≤ so that all production has 
non-increasing returns to scale in labor.  In equilibrium labor supply and labor demand 
must be equal:  
  jt t
j
nN = ∑  (5) 
The nominal marginal cost of production is the cost of hiring an additional unit of 
a productive input times the number of inputs required to produce an additional unit of 
output.  Because labor is free to flow from one industry to the next, the nominal wage 
rate Wt will be the same across industries.  In our model, labor is the only input to 
production.  Thus, we write the nominal marginal cost in industry j as  
 
1 N
jt t jt jt t jt MC W x n W MP
− ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ∂∂= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , (6) 
where 
N
jt MP  is the marginal product of labor in sector j.    10
We assume that firms have constant desired markups over marginal costs.
10  This 
assumption serves to isolate the direct role of sticky prices in generating business cycles.  
With constant desired markups, any deviation of the markup from its desired level must 
come from nominal rigidities.  Thus, the sticky prices in the final goods markets do all of 
the work in our model.  The desired markup in sector j is denoted as 
*
j µ . 
Firms that are able to change prices freely simply maintain their constant desired 
markups.  For these firms 
*
jt j µµ = .  Firms with sticky prices will endure periods in 
which their markups deviate from their desired level.  In a period of monetary expansion, 
these firms will have actual (or ex post) markups that fall below the planned or ex ante 
level.
11   
 
3.3 DURABLE GOODS AND TEMPORARY SHOCKS 
Several results stem directly from the presence of highly durable goods in models with 
temporary shocks.  These results are only approximate in nature and the approximations 
are best when the durables are very long-lived.   
 
Intertemporal Substitution and Purchases of Durable Goods 
In sections 4 and 5, we show that the behavior of sticky price models depends crucially 
on how durable goods prices are set.  The reason that durable goods sectors exert so 
much influence over these models is that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for 
purchases of durable goods is inherently high.  The lower the rate of depreciation is, the 
higher is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  For durables like housing, with 
annual rates of depreciation less than five percent, this elasticity is nearly infinite.   
To be more specific, we claim that the shadow value (γ ) of a long-lived durable is 
roughly constant when shocks are temporary.  Since real effects of money shocks are 
inherently temporary, γ should be approximately constant following a change in the 
money supply.   
                                                 
10 This can be justified with a C.E.S. (Dixit-Stiglitz) preference structure.  We use this formulation 
explicitly for the numerical model in the next section.  More generally, firms will desire markups that 
fluctuate with changes in demand. See Bils [1989] for a discussion of endogenous markups.  
11 We do not need to take a position on the exact form of price stickiness at this point.  In the simulations, 
we use a Calvo specification to generate price rigidity.    11
To understand this claim, it is useful to return to equation (1), which expresses 
this shadow value as a discounted sum of marginal utilities:  
  () ()
2 2
,1 ,2 1 1 ...
DD D
jt jt j j t j j t MU MU MU γβ δβ δ ++ =+ − + − +  
We make two observations:  First, the steady state stock-flow ratio is 1/ j δ .
12  For a 
highly durable good, this ratio is high (by definition).  Suppose for the moment that the 
marginal utility terms in (1) depend only on the stock of the durable in question.  Because 
the stock-flow ratio is high, even large changes in purchases will have only minor effects 
on the total quantity of the durable.  Modest fluctuations around the steady state leave the 
stock of such goods, and thus their shadow value, nearly constant at cyclical frequencies.  
In this case, γjt will display minimal cyclical movement.   
In general, the marginal utility of a durable depends on both the stock of the 
durable and on other goods and services.  Changes in the production or consumption of 
other goods could influence the marginal utility terms in (1) and cause γ  to change.  This 
brings us to our second observation: γ is a forward-looking variable.  The extent to which 
γ is forward-looking depends on the subjective rate of time preference (β) and on the 
economic rate of depreciation (δ ).  Again, because monetary shocks are temporary, only 
the first several terms in the sum will be affected by interactions with other variables.  If 
β is high and δ is low, the shadow value is dominated by future terms and the change in γ 
due to a temporary shock is small.   
These observations suggest that it is reasonable to treat the shadow values of 
highly durable goods as roughly constant in response to monetary disturbances and other 
temporary shocks.  For durables with rapid rates of depreciation (computers and vehicles 
for instance) the approximation is less justifiable.   
 
Relative Prices and Real Interest Rates  
The near constancy of the shadow value of highly durable goods has important 
implications.  One implication is that the relative price of one durable to another should 
remain roughly constant over the business cycle.   
                                                 
12 Our model does not have long-run growth.  With growth, the stock-flow ratio is 1/(δ + growth rate).     12
In neoclassical models, consumers choose their spending so that the marginal 


















= ≈ . 
Thus, while the relative prices of nondurables may react to monetary policy, for highly 
durable goods, relative prices will remain constant.  Because our model allows workers to 
flow freely across sectors, constant relative prices imply that cyclical movements in the 
real product wages (Wt / Pj,t) in durables sectors must be highly correlated.
13  
Many economists feel that real interest rates are central to the monetary 
transmission mechanism.  In economies with more than one good, one cannot talk about 
the real interest rate without ambiguity.  Instead, every commodity has its “own real rate 















+ ≡ +=, (7) 
where the second equality comes from the Euler equation (3).  In general, these real rates 
of return can vary across commodities and over time due to variations in the shadow 
values.  
For a long-lived durable, however, the own real rate of return must remain 
constant in the face of a monetary policy shock.  Again this is a consequence of  , jt j γγ ≈  
when j is a durable.  The near constancy of the shadow value implies that the real interest 
elasticity of demand for these goods is nearly infinite.  Thus, whatever effects monetary 
policy has on other real interest rates, the real rate of return on durables will not react to 
monetary policy.   
The constant shadow value of durables also has consequences for nondurables.  
Consider a nondurable (good i).  Its shadow value is simply its marginal utility: 
                                                 
13 While there are distinct real product wages for the nondurables, there is really only one real wage for 
durable goods.  Condition (4) shows that real product wages for durable goods must be procyclical.  
Although real product wages in many sectors may exhibit either pro- or counter-cyclicality, in our model, 
only real wages in durables sectors need be procyclical.     13
,,
C
it it MU γ ≈ .  If the utility function is additively separable in consumption then the 
marginal utility is only a function of Ci,t : () ,, '
C
it it MUu C = .  Then, if j is a long-lived 
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. 
This equation says that, in equilibrium, consumption (and production) of a nondurable is 
matched by the change in its price relative to any one of the durables.  We return to this 
point later in the numerical simulations.  
 
4.  FLEXIBLE DURABLE GOODS PRICES 
The focus of the paper is on the role that durable goods play in sticky price models.  The 
facts are clear: real purchases of durables are extremely procyclical.  This is especially 
true for the production of new homes.  In addition, the real relative price of durables to 
nondurables rises following a monetary expansion.  Coherent models of the monetary 
business cycle should be able to reproduce these facts.   
In this section we demonstrate that flexible durable goods prices present problems 
for sticky price models of the business cycle.  To make this point starkly, we consider a 
durable with fully flexible prices.  This is an instructive special case because it clearly 
exposes the problem and the mechanisms at work in the model.  We assume the good is 
sufficiently durable (i.e. its depreciation rate is sufficiently low) that our approximation 
of a constant shadow value is appropriate.   
 
4.1 THE COMOVEMENT OF DURABLE GOODS PURCHASES 
The acyclicality of the shadow price of the durable leads us to drop the time subscript and 





P tj vN γ ≈ .  Since prices are flexible in this sector, the price of the good is a 
constant markup over its marginal cost:  () ,,
N
jt j t jt PW M P µ = .  Combining these 
expressions (in essence, equating labor supply and labor demand) implies that:   14







≈ . (8) 
This equation bears directly on the comovement of aggregate employment and 
production of the durable in question.  If aggregate employment rises in response to 
expansionary monetary policy, then v′(Nt) rises, reflecting the fact that workers are being 
drawn up their labor supply curves.  To maintain equality, the right hand side of (8) must 
also rise.  With γj and µj time-invariant, the marginal product of labor must rise and 
employment in the durables sector falls.  Thus, employment and output in a long-lived 
durable industry exhibits negative comovement with aggregate employment and output 
whenever the durable has a flexible price. 
This result is remarkably robust.  Aside from the assumption of labor mobility, 
deriving equation (8) required only that the good was a long-lived durable with flexible 
prices (i.e.  jt γ  and  jt µ  were approximately constant).  Among other things, the negative 
comovement of flexibly priced durables is independent of the demand structure of the 
other goods, the form of price rigidity in the sticky-price sectors, and the money supply 
rule.  As a result, the ability of a sticky price model to match basic features of the data is 
severely compromised if long-lived durables have flexible prices.   
 
4.2 STICKY PRICES AND THE NEUTRALITY OF MONEY 
The comovement problem concerns the behavior of a single durable goods sector as 
aggregate employment varied.  We can go further if all durables had flexible prices.  In 
this case, even if most of the goods in the economy have sticky prices, it is possible for 
money to be neutral with respect to aggregate output and employment.  Like models in 
which all prices are flexible, the aggregate price level will move one-for-one with 
changes in the money supply.   
Unlike the comovement result, the conditions for aggregate neutrality are more 
stringent.  In addition to assuming that labor is mobile, we assume that the marginal rate 
of transformation from one good to another is constant.  An easy way to ensure a constant 
marginal rate of transformation is to assume that production is linear in each sector so 
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γγ
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≈ = . 
Since the marginal product of labor is constant, we have one equation in the one 
aggregate variable Nt.  Following a money shock, the level of employment that solves 
this equation is the steady state level of employment.  Thus, aggregate employment will 
not vary over the cycle and money will be neutral.  This is approximately true regardless 
of how much price rigidity there is in the nondurables sectors and regardless of the ratio 
of nondurables to durables.     
A constant marginal rate of transformation can also be achieved with constant 
returns to scale production functions and mobile factors.  To see this, suppose that 
production requires both labor and capital.  The aggregate capital stock (K) is fixed but 
capital can flow freely across sectors.  Let kjt denote the capital in sector j.   
Assume that production in each sector has the same constant returns to scale 
production function: 
() ,, , , jt jt jt X Fk n = . 
Because factors flow freely across industries, nominal wages and rental prices will be 
equal in each sector.  Since the production function is homogeneous of degree one, cost 
minimization implies that the capital-to-labor ratios will equalize across industries 
regardless of which ones have sticky prices and which ones have flexible prices.  
Industries that increase production do so by hiring capital and labor in the same 






The marginal product of labor in any sector depends only on the capital-to-labor ratio: 
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Equating labor supply and labor demand in the durable goods sector gives  
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This is one equation in aggregate employment ( t N ), and again employment is 
approximately constant and money is neutral.
14 
 
4.3 IMMOBILE LABOR AND “FACTOR ATTACHMENT” 
Many researchers emphasize the important role that factor attachment can play in sticky 
price models (see for instance Ball and Romer [1990], Kimball [1995] and Woodford 
[2003]).  Because it insulates one industry from another, factor attachment slows down 
price adjustment by tempering the increase in costs for firms that reset their prices.   
The model we presented above does not have factor attachment.  We made 
exactly the opposite assumption: labor (and capital) were free to flow from one industry 
to another.  If aggregate employment rose then costs rose in all industries.  To allow for 
factor attachment, we modify the model by changing the utility function.   
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This utility function embodies an extreme form of factor attachment: each industry has its 
own labor supply pool and there is no substitution of labor at all across industries.  
  With factor attachment, pressure on labor markets in sticky price sectors has no 
effect on the supply of labor in flexible price sectors.  The labor market clearing 
condition in a durable sector with flexible prices is now: 
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This equation pins down  jt N .  When factors are totally bound to specific sectors, 
employment in (flexibly priced) durable goods sectors  will not vary with the business 
cycle.  Thus, although factor attachment helps to alleviate comovement problems, it 
cannot solve them.  By itself, factor attachment can, at most, render these industries 
acyclical.  
 
                                                 
14 If productive capital is highly durable, we do not need to assume that it is fixed.  Like all long-lived 
durables, the aggregate capital stock will not move much over the cycle.  In this case, we can safely treat Kt 
as approximately fixed over business cycle horizons.   17
4.4 DISCUSSION 
What is the underlying mechanism generating the comovement and neutrality results? 
Following a monetary expansion, sticky price firms continue to meet demand at fixed 
prices.  In terms of utility, the marginal cost of an additional unit of good j is 
() '/
N
tj t vN M P.  The incipient increase in output in sticky price sectors increases the 
demand for labor, which, in turn raises  ( ) ' t vN and raises marginal costs. In a more 
general model, as the economy expands, pressure on all input markets (labor markets, 
markets for fuel and raw materials, etc.) rises.  
In the face of rising marginal costs, flexible price firms maintain their markups by 
raising prices.  Is there a sufficient shift in demand for the flexibly priced product to more 
than offset the contractionary effect of the price increase?  For a sufficiently long-lived 
durable good, the answer is no.  The demand schedule for such a good does not shift very 
much because the shadow value of the durable is largely invariant to temporary shocks. 
Since the rise in the real price of durables is temporary, consumers intertemporally 
substitute and postpone purchases.   
In the data, production of durables (housing in particular) seems to respond 
strongly to monetary policy.  Because monetary shocks in sticky price models do not 
shift the demand curves for these goods, models based on nominal rigidities must 
attribute some price rigidity directly to durable goods sectors.   
 
5. SIMULATING THE MODEL 
While the results in the previous section are robust to a variety of specifications, they 
apply only when durable goods have perfectly flexible prices.  To see what happens when 
durables have rigid prices requires a numerical analysis.  For numerical solutions, we 
must take a stand on the precise functional forms for the utility, and production functions, 
and for the precise nature of price rigidity.   
To keep matters simple, the numerical model has only two sectors: a durable 
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The CES aggregator has the (standard) properties that as the elasticity of substitution ρ 




ψψ , and as ρ → 0, the utility function becomes Leontief so 
that Ct and Dt are perfect complements. σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
and η is the Frisch labor supply elasticity (φ is a scaling parameter).   
For this model, the consumer’s demand and supply functions can be summarized 
by two equations: an Euler equation and a labor supply equation.  
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Where Px,t and Pc,t  are the nominal prices of the durable and the nondurable and where 
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Final goods in each sector are produced from intermediate goods according to a 
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:  
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for j = C, D.  Final goods producers are competitive while each intermediate goods 
producer enjoys a local monopoly.  Free entry into the production of final goods implies:   
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 (16) 
for j = C, D.  ε is the price elasticity of demand.  Because the elasticity of demand is 
constant in this setting, it is optimal to maintain a constant markup over nominal marginal   19
costs.  This markup is  1 1 ε
ε µ − => .  We assume that the production of intermediate goods 
in each industry is linear in employment so that () () ,, jt jt X sA n s = .
15 
We use a Calvo price setting mechanism to motivate sluggish price adjustment.  
j θ  is the probability that a firm in industry j = C, D cannot reset its price in any one 
period. Thus, in each period, 1 j θ −  firms reset their prices while  j θ  firms have prices that 
are stuck at their levels from the previous period.  When they can, firms set prices so the 
expected average markup over the foreseeable future equals its desired markup.  The 
optimal reset price is a weighted average of current and future marginal costs.   
If v  is the percent deviation of a variable v from its steady state value, then, to a 
first order approximation, the optimal reset price (
*
, jt P ) satisfies: 
 
**
,, , , 1 (1 ) jt jt t jt t jt PW E P θβ θβ + ⎡ ⎤ ≈− + ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
   (17) 
(Note, if there were no price rigidity, θ  = 0 and prices would be proportional to nominal 
marginal cost).  Using (15) we can approximate the final goods prices as:  
 
*
,, 1 , (1 ) jt j jt j jt PP P θθ − =+ −    (18) 
Because price adjustment under the Calvo mechanism is random, the aggregate 
production functions are:  
  ,, jt jt X AN =  (19) 
where  () ,, jt jt Nn s d s =∫  for j = C, D.   
Finally, we assume the money supply follows a random walk:  
  1 ttt MM ξ − =+ , (20) 
where  t ξ  is a mean zero i.i.d. disturbance.  The model is solved by log-linear 
approximation in the neighborhood of the non-stochastic steady state.   
 
Parameter Values: 
We choose parameter values that are typical in the business cycle literature.  Table 2 
summarizes our parameter settings.  We set the Frisch labor supply elasticity (η ) to 1.  
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ ) is 0.2 and the subjective time discount 
                                                 
15 Though somewhat unorthodox, this specification illustrates the “neutrality result” from section 4.2.    20
factor (β  ) is .98, which implies a real interest rate of 2% per year.  We assume that 
1 ρ =  so that the within-period utility function is 
cd
tt CD
ψψ . ε is set to give a desired 
markup of 10%.  We set the annual depreciation rate to 10%.
16  ψc and ψd are set to give 
a steady state ratio of nondurables to GDP of 0.75.   
We consider various degrees of price rigidity.  As a benchmark, we assume that 
sticky-price sectors have Calvo parameters that imply a six-month half-life of exogenous 
price rigidity (i.e. for any firm, there is a 50% chance that it will be able to reset its price 
within half a year).  For models with staggered price setting, this corresponds to one year 
of fixed prices.  A six-month half-life requires an annual continuous time Calvo 
parameter of  () 2ln 2 1.3863 = , so that on average firms reset prices 1.4 times per year.
17  
 
5.1 SYMMETRIC PRICE RIGIDITY 
We begin by considering symmetric price rigidity.  That is, we assume that prices are 
equally sticky across sectors.  Because production is linear, the model has a constant 
marginal rate of transformation across sectors.  This is a natural place to start since many 
sticky price models have only one good and thus implicitly make both of these 
assumptions. 
   
Nondurable Goods 
Many New Keynesian models omit durable goods entirely.
18  Because models with only 
nondurables are prevalent in the literature, we consider this special case first.   
Suppose the economy produces a single nondurable good.  Thus  tt t CXA N ==  
and  tt t t M PC PAN == .  Figure 2.A (the top row of panels) shows the model’s reaction to 
a permanent unanticipated one percent increase in the money supply.   
                                                 
16 Buildings have depreciation rates that are closer to 3%, vehicles and transportation equipment have 
depreciation rates that are closer to 15%. We use 10% because it is a standard value in the business cycle 
literature. See Hulten and Wykof [1979] and [1981] or Fraumeni [1997] for more details.  
17 This is a considerable amount of price rigidity.  Bils and Klenow [2002] find that, on average, prices of 
many consumer goods change once every four months, which suggests a Calvo parameter closer to 3. 
18 Prominent examples include Clarida, Gali and Gertler [1999], Rotemberg and Woodford [1997], and 
Woodford [2003].  Dotsey, King and Wolman [1999] include capital as a fixed factor.  Kimball [1995], and 
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2000] include capital as a variable factor of production.    21
The first panel plots the change in production.  Prices are sticky in the short run.  
Thus, immediately after the shock, production and consumption rise by one percent.  In 
the first quarter following the shock, GDP is above trend by 0.66 percent.  The second 
panel shows the evolution of prices.  Over time, prices adjust and production, 
employment and consumption all return to their steady state levels.     
The last panel shows the reaction of interest rates.  Since there is only one good, 
there is a single real interest rate.  The real rate of return is related to consumption via the 
Euler equation:  















Since consumption is falling,  () () 1 '' tt t uC EuC β + ⎡ ⎤ < ⎣ ⎦ , and the real interest rate is below 
its steady state level.  As prices adjust, the real interest rate returns to its steady state 
level.   
In short, in the model with only nondurables, monetary policy shocks have very 
conventional effects:  Real interest rates fall; production and employment temporarily 
rise; and prices slowly adjust to their new long-run levels.   
 
Durable and Nondurable Goods.    
Now we augment the model with a sector that produces long-lived durables.  As before, 
prices are equally sticky throughout the economy.  Figure 2.B (the lower row of panels) 
shows the equilibrium reaction to the same money shock.   
  The first panel shows total GDP, total nondurable consumption and the total 
production of the durable good.  As before, output and employment increase in the short 
run and then slowly fall back to their steady state levels.  In the first quarter following the 
shock, total output rises by 0.82%.
19  Production of the durable increases by 3.2% in the 
first quarter.  Unlike the previous case however, production of the nondurable remains 
almost constant; in the quarter after the shock, production rises by 0.02%.  In essence, the 
production of new durable goods accounts for the entire increase in GDP.   
                                                 
19 The plot makes it look like output rises by 1% because it is plotting the first 100
th of a year rather than 
the first quarter. Note that because output is linear in employment, the employment response is also 0.82%.    22
Because prices are equally sticky, and because the marginal rate of transformation 
is constant, the relative price of durables to nondurables does not change.  Thus, 
, '( ) tD t uC γ = .  If the stock-flow distinction for the durable is strong, then  , D tD γγ ≈  and 
u'(Ct) and thus Ct are approximately constant.  This relates to a result from Section 3: 
nondurable consumption is determined by the equilibrium behavior of the relative price 
P
x/P
c.  With symmetric price rigidity and a constant marginal rate of transformation, this 
relative price is constant so nondurable consumption doesn’t react to monetary 
disturbances.  This is true even though their prices are very sticky.  That there are 
nondurables with sticky prices that don’t react to monetary policy is completely 
consistent with theories of nominal rigidity.   
The last panel plots the response of interest rates.  In Section 3, we concluded that 
the own real rates of return on durables were constant.  In the simulation, we see that 
neither the own real rate of return on durables nor the own real rate on nondurables reacts 
to the shock.  The real interest rate for nondurables is unchanged because nondurable 
consumption itself doesn’t move.  Since the real rates of return are constant, nominal 
interest rates rise to reflect the increased expected inflation. 
 
5.2 ASYMMETRIC PRICE RIGIDITY 
We now consider what happens when some goods have flexible prices.  We begin with 
flexible nondurable goods prices and sticky durable goods prices.  Because the 
nondurables have flexible prices and are seventy five percent of GDP one might think 
that the response of the model to monetary shocks would be roughly one quarter of the 
response when all prices were sticky.  As we will see, this is not the case.   
 
Sticky Durables Prices and Flexible Nondurables Prices 
Suppose that the nondurable goods have fully flexible prices while the durables have 
sticky prices.  Recall that the durables industry is the smaller industry; only 25% of GDP 
has sticky prices. Figure 3.A (the top row) shows the response to the monetary shock.   
Even though durables (the sticky price goods) are only one quarter of GDP, 
output rises by 0.46% in the first quarter.  This is more than half of the increase in GDP 
when all prices were sticky.  There is a modest comovement problem.  Nondurable   23
consumption falls by 0.13% in the first quarter while durable goods production rises by 
2.21 percent.  This is not unlike the behavior we see in the data.  
Because prices differ across sectors, there is a difference between the aggregate 
price level and the price of either the durable or the nondurable alone.  We define the 
aggregate price level as  ,, tC t X t PP CP X ≡ +  where C and X are steady state levels of 
nondurable and durable goods production.  In the figure, the aggregate price level (the 
dark line) jumps after the shock and then slowly converges to the higher level.  The 
figure also shows that both individual prices adjust slowly.  Even though the price of the 
nondurable is completely flexible it behaves in a manner similar to a sticky price good.   
Like the model with symmetric price rigidity, real interest rates show almost no 
change when nondurables have flexible prices and again, the nominal interest rate rises 
slightly due to expected inflation.   
So, even when durables are only a small fraction of total GDP, when their prices 
are sticky, the model behaves much like a model in which all prices are sticky.  A 
comparison of Figure 3.A with Figure 2.B shows that the model can be deprived of 
seventy five percent of its price rigidity and still retain the basic response to monetary 
shocks: After a monetary shock, prices adjust slowly and interest rates are moderately 
affected; GDP and employment on the other hand, react strongly to the shock. 
 
Flexible Durables Prices and Sticky Nondurables Prices 
Now consider the opposite case in which durables have flexible prices while nondurables 
have sticky prices.  Since the durables have flexible prices and because the marginal rate 
of transformation across sectors is constant, the analysis in Section 4 applies: We should 
observe a pronounced comovement problem and a very minor change in total production.  
Figure 3.B shows the response of the model.   
The simulation confirms the approximation result: even though the production of 
nondurables accounts for 75% of GDP, output barely changes after the money shock.  In 
the first quarter after the shock, output – and thus aggregate employment – falls by a very 
small amount (0.02%).  Even though most prices are sticky, money has essentially no 
effect on employment and output.  The source of this neutrality is the negative 
comovement in the two sectors.  Consumption rises by 0.78% and production of durables   24
falls by 2.44% in the first quarter.  In the aggregate, these exactly offset and total 
production is unchanged. 
The price of nondurables rises slowly while the price of durables overshoots in 
the short run.  The aggregate price level jumps by exactly 1% immediately following the 
monetary shock.   
  Notice that both the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate for nondurable 
consumption fall after the monetary expansion.  Even though durables are perceived as 
“interest sensitive” components of aggregate demand, low interest rates do not increase 
demand for these goods enough to counteract the increased cost of production. 
 
5.3 MODIFICATIONS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Durables play an important role in the numerical model.  When all prices are sticky, the 
presence of durable goods implies that neither real interest rates nor the production of 
nondurables reacts to monetary policy.  The model behaves in much the same way 
provided the durables have sticky prices; even if they represent a larger share of 
production, the rigidity or flexibility of the nondurables had very little bearing on the 
reaction of the model to monetary shocks.  On the other hand, if the durables have 
flexible prices, output and employment don’t react and the aggregate price level is always 
proportional to the money supply.  This awkward behavior is unaffected by price rigidity 
in the nondurables sector.  
Here we consider some modifications to the model.  Among other things, we ask 
whether the results depend on complete price flexibility or whether they survive when 
prices are only moderately flexible.   
 
Relative Price Flexibility 
The analysis above assumed that the flexible price sector had completely flexible prices.  
Here we consider mixed cases in which both prices are sticky but one is relatively more 
flexible than the other.  These experiments show that the preceding analysis is not a 
knife-edge case but rather continues to hold when prices are highly (though perhaps not 
fully) flexible.   25
Figure 4 shows the equilibrium reaction of output, consumption, and durable 
goods production as we vary the degree of exogenous nominal rigidity in the two sectors.  
The upper row (Figure 4.A) considers variations in the Calvo parameter for the 
nondurable goods sector (θ c).  The Calvo parameter for the durables (θ x) is held constant 
at 1.3863.  θ c ranges from 1 (one price change per year on average) to 24 (two price 
changes each month).   
It is surprising just how little this parameter influences the model over this range.  
While it is clear that employment and production respond more when nondurables have 
sticky prices, the basic character of the reaction (of GDP, consumption and durables 
production) is the same for the different settings.  The magnitude and general profile of 
the impulse responses when nondurables reset prices once a year is roughly the same as 
when nondurables reset prices once every two weeks.   
The lower panel (Figure 4.B) considers variations in the Calvo parameter for the 
durable goods sector.  Unlike the price rigidity for nondurable goods, changes in the price 
rigidity of durable goods have drastic effects on the equilibrium.  When θ x = 4, the 
model reacts in a conventional way.  In contrast, when durable goods prices are reset 
once every month (θ x = 12), the equilibrium response of total production (and aggregate 
employment) to the money shock is essentially gone after one quarter.  Quarterly data 
from this model would suggest that production was white noise.  High values of θ x also 
generate negative comovement between the production of durables and nondurables.   
   
Changes in the Share of Sticky Price Goods and in the Depreciation Rate 
In Figure 5 we consider two other sensitivity checks.  Figure 5.A plots the percent change 
in GDP in the year following the monetary shock as we vary the share of the sticky price 
sector.  At the far left, no goods have sticky prices.  At the far right, all goods have sticky 
prices.  The two lines distinguish the model with sticky durables prices (the solid line) 
from the model with sticky nondurables prices (the dashed line). 
In each case, as the fraction of sticky price goods drops, the output response gets 
smaller.  When the sticky price goods are nondurables, however, the output response falls 
very rapidly.  Even when 80% of GDP has sticky prices, the first quarter response of 
GDP is less than one fifth of the response when all prices are sticky.  When the durables   26
have sticky prices, the fall in the output response is much more gradual.  The output 
response when 20% of GDP has sticky prices is half the response when all prices are 
sticky.  Output increases more when 10% of GDP consists of durables with sticky prices 
than when 90% of GDP consists of nondurables with sticky prices.   
Figure 5.B considers variation in the depreciation rate for the durable.  Again, the 
two lines distinguish the model with sticky durable goods prices from the model with 
sticky nondurable goods prices.   The horizontal axis represents the degree of durability.  
Moving to the right is an increase in durability (indicated by a lower depreciation rate).  
As in the upper panel, the vertical axis represents the increase in production in the year 
after the shock.   
When the durable prices are sticky, output responds more when the depreciation 
rate is lower.  When the depreciation rate is low, workers can accumulate the durable 
without substantial reductions in its shadow value.  In contrast, when the good is less 
durable, increases in production imply that the marginal utility of the good drops 
substantially.  Workers offset this effect, to some extent, by working less.  As we would 
expect, when durables have flexible prices, increases in durability imply that the stock-
flow distinction is sharper.  Thus our neutrality approximation works quite well.  If the 
depreciation rate is .03 per year (which is comparable to the depreciation rate for houses), 
employment increases by less that 0.02 percent in the year following the shock.  
 
“Demand” Complementarities.  
When sticky price sectors expand after a money shock, positive spillovers increase 
demand for other goods even if their prices are flexible.  Because money shocks are 
temporary, however, complementarities have only a limited effect on the shadow value of 
durables.  Because most of the benefits of acquiring a long-lived durable come in the long 
run, spillover effects from a temporary economic disturbance will have only a small 
influence on the shadow value of the good.  On the other hand, complementarities can 
have important effects on the shadow value of nondurables.  Specifically, such 
complementarities tie consumption of nondurables to the stock of durables.  If the stock 
of the durable does not change much (due to a high stock-flow ratio), then strong demand   27
complementarities reduce the incentive to produce the nondurable.  In the limit, the 
production of nondurables should not react to the shock.   
Figures 6.A and 6.B show the reaction of output, consumption and the production 
of durables as we vary the degree of complementarity between the nondurable and the 
durable.  Complementarity between Ct and Dt is governed by ρ.  As ρ approaches 0 the 
goods become perfect complements.  We consider  1 ρ = , 0.5, 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01.   
Again we focus on asymmetric price rigidity.  The top row (6.A) assumes that the 
nondurables have flexible prices while the bottom row (6.B) assumes that durables have 
flexible prices.  In each case, the production of nondurables gets smaller and smaller as 
complementary increases.  When the nondurable had flexible prices (top row), the 
original change in production was small to begin with.  As a result, the increased 
complementarity has little effect on the equilibrium.   
When the durable has flexible prices, the increased complementarity suppresses 
the incentive to consume more of the nondurable.  Output is still approximately neutral 
(the neutrality result does not rely on the utility function).  Since neither Y nor C changes 
as complementarity becomes complete, in the limit there is no change in the production 
of durables either.  When durables have flexible prices, complementarities between 
durables and nondurables cause the aggregate neutrality of money to spread to a sector by 
sector neutrality of money.
20   
 
Sticky Wages and Input Prices. 
When inputs into production have sticky prices, the price of the final good will 
endogenously inherit some nominal rigidity.  This may be why production of certain 
durables (and nondurables) reacts to monetary policy even though their prices seem 
flexible.  Mathematically, wage rigidity invalidates equation (4).  Workers are off their 
labor supply curves and thus do not equate the marginal disutility of work with the 
marginal benefit of working.  
                                                 
20 This discussion focused on “demand complementarities” by which we mean spillover effects from 
consumption of one good to another.  “Productive complementarities” behave differently.  Because they 
reduce costs of production, a complementarity between the production of nondurables with the production 
of durables would reduce the tendency for negative comovement of flexibly priced durables.   28
Here we modify our two-sector model to allow for sticky wages.  We follow 
Erceg, Henderson and Levin [2000] by modeling wage rigidity as a third Calvo process. 
Effective labor, Lt, is an aggregate of labor “types”:  
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 (22) 
Wages for each worker type are set by unions.  Unions maximize the utility of the 
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Let  w θ  be the probability that a union cannot reset its wage in a given period.  To 
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t W  is the aggregate nominal wage rate and 
*
t w  is the optimal “reset wage”. 
Figure 7.A shows how the model reacts to a monetary expansion when durables 
prices are sticky but nondurables prices are flexible.  We consider different degrees of 
wage rigidity.   w θ  ranges from 1, which implies that wages are reset on average once per 
year, to  w θ =∞ which corresponds to completely flexible wages.  Figure 7.B considers 
the same experiment under the assumption that durables have flexible prices while 
nondurables are rigid.   
The equilibrium responses look similar to the impulse responses in Figures 4.A 
and 4.B (the differences between them are largely due to differences in the amount of 
wage and price rigidity we considered).  As in Figure 4, additional wage rigidity does not 
change the equilibrium much when durable goods prices are sticky – it plays a much 
more important role when durables have flexible prices.     29
We have also included a plot of the aggregate real wage in the last panel.  The 
aggregate real wage is defined as  tt WP  where  t P  is the aggregate price level.  Not 
surprisingly, as wages become more and more rigid, the aggregate real wage becomes 
less and less procyclical.   
While they are not necessary when durable goods prices are sticky, nominal 
wages may play an important role in generating price rigidity for durable goods whose 
prices would be flexible otherwise.  Other forms of sticky intermediate goods prices will 
function much the same way.   
  
7. CONCLUSION 
Durable goods feature prominently in discussions of monetary policy.  In the data, they 
appear to be among the sectors that respond most to changes in monetary policy.  In 
addition, because durables are perceived as highly interest sensitive items, they also have 
a central position in the theory of the monetary transmission mechanism.  It is therefore 
somewhat surprising that durables have received so little attention in sticky price models 
of the business cycle.  While sticky-price models have assumed a leading role in 
monetary business cycle theory, much of our understanding of these models comes from 
models without durables.   
  In this paper we examine the consequences that stem from including durable 
goods in otherwise conventional sticky price models.  We show that the behavior of 
sticky price models depends heavily on whether durable goods are present and whether 
these goods have sticky prices.  If durable goods prices are sticky, then even a small 
durables sector can cause the model to behave as though most, or all, prices were sticky.  
If durable goods prices are flexible then the model exhibits perverse behavior.  Flexibly 
priced durables contract during periods of economic expansion.  The tendency towards 
negative comovement is very robust and can be so strong as to dominate the aggregate 
behavior of the model.   
The possibility that some long-lived durables have relatively flexible prices is not 
entirely academic.  This is especially true given the lack of direct empirical evidence of 
price rigidity of such goods.  One could argue for instance that housing construction is a 
flexible price sector of the sort analyzed in this paper.  There is no question that   30
residential housing is very durable; the stock-flow ratio is roughly 55 to 1.
21  In the data 
the price of new houses falls relative to other prices after a monetary contraction.  Table 2 
shows that unlike the CPI, for which inflation is positively serially correlated, inflation in 
the median (and average) price of new houses displays negative serial correlation.  This 
suggests that these prices jump and indeed tend to overshoot.   This is inconsistent with 
incomplete (partial) nominal adjustment, which implies that prices should undershoot.  
Therefore, the overshooting suggests that house prices may be quite flexible.  New 
construction also plays an important part in the business cycle.  In 2000, residential 
investment accounted for 412 billion dollars – roughly 4% of GDP.  Fluctuations in 
residential investment account for more than 18% of the fluctuations in GDP.   
There are also conceptual reasons to believe that certain durables have flexible 
prices.  Some durables (like housing) are relatively expensive on a per-unit basis.  If 
implicit or explicit menu costs have important fixed components, there is more incentive 
to negotiate on the price of these goods.  Moreover, some durables are priced for the first 
time when they are sold.
 22   Others require considerable customization, which is often 
accompanied by price negotiations.
23    
 Sticky price models require additional features if they are to accommodate 
durables with flexible prices and still match the central features of the data.  To this end, 
wage rigidity, factor attachments and borrowing constraints may be necessary features of 
New Keynesian theories.   
                                                 
21 There are roughly 72 million owner occupied houses in the U.S. In 2000, there were 1.3 million housing 
starts of 1-4 unit dwellings. 
22 For sticky prices to affect the quantity produced, prices must be set prior to production.  House prices 
are often negotiated and are likely to be determined when they are sold.   
23 Zbaracki, et al. [2002] present evidence obtained “in the field” on negotiations between large business 
customers and sales representatives of a large supplier of industrial durables.  They show that salesmen 
have considerable leeway to offer deals to customers who express dissatisfaction with the list price.   31
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Inflation  k
th Order Autocorrelation: 
Lag k:   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
CPI   0.73  0.69  0.71  0.60  0.55  0.51  0.45  0.35  0.37  0.35  0.31  0.30 
Nondurables CPI    0.41  0.46  0.46  0.32  0.28  0.26  0.23  0.08  0.14  0.09  0.08  0.05 
Durables CPI  0.66  0.58  0.64  0.49  0.46  0.50  0.41  0.39  0.45  0.35  0.33  0.31 
Automobiles CPI  0.26  0.19  0.14  0.25  0.31  0.14  0.15  0.17  0.21  0.20  0.11  0.04 
Avg House Price  -0.37  0.21  -0.08  0.04  0.12  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.08  0.05  0.01  -0.06 
Med House Price  -0.37  0.09  0.06  0.05  -0.01  0.01  0.05  -0.04  0.02  0.06  -0.07  0.00 
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GDP = Non-Durable Consumption









Figure 2.A: Non-durable Goods Only
Prices
Non-Durables Prices






























































































































































































































Figure 4.A: Changing the Nominal Rigidity for Non-durables
Consumption






































































Figure 4.B: Changing the Nominal Rigidity for Durables
Consumption





























































) Figure 5.A: Variation in the Share of Sticky Price Goods in GDP
Sticky Durable Goods
Sticky Non-durable Goods



















































) Figure 5.B: Varying the Degree of Durability
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Figure 6.A: Flexible Non-durable Goods Prices
Consumption








































































Figure 6.B: Flexible Durable Goods Prices
Consumption









































































Figure 7.A: Wage Rigidity when Durable Goods Prices are Sticky
Consumption

















































































Figure 7.B: Wage Rigidity when Durable Goods Prices are Flexible
Consumption





















Figure 7: Sticky Wages and Durable Goods 